

IRREGULAR WARFARE: SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
TRANSFORMATION

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

IRREGULAR WARFARE: TRANSFORMING JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION, by Major Bryan H. Cannady, USAF, 100 pages.

Irregular warfare is emerging as a dominant form of warfare for the future. Yet irregular warfare, at its root, contains many of the characteristics found on today's battlefield in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). At the forefront of the GWOT and irregular warfare is United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) and special operations forces (SOF). As the designated lead for GWOT and the primary lead for irregular warfare, USSOCOM is the leading force in the emerging operational environment. Yet as SOF's relevancy increases, SOF integration continues to suffer within joint Service integration. The root of this required cultural integration begins with joint professional military education (JPME). As a primary player in the future operational environment and the required total joint force integration, special operations must take a leading role in professional military education (PME), yet the current architecture of JPME does not facilitate or include this required SOF integration. This blending is critical to the success of our future joint force and requires potential Congressional action as the Defense Department, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all Services adopt specific directives for SOF integration allowing "service-like" equality to USSOCOM for the purpose of JPME.

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This year has challenged my ability to juggle priorities as the school's leadership encouraged the student body to balance family, faith, fellowship, fitness, and fun as well as education. I feel that I was able to strike a sufficient balance while simultaneously concluding a thesis that I felt passionate about.

First, I would like to thank and honor God for providing strength, wisdom, and discernment to invoke critical thought and to articulate the conclusions on this subject.

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ACRONYMS

CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DoD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GNA	Goldwater-Nichols Act
GWOT	Global War On Terror
GPF	General Purpose Forces
ILC	Intermediate-Level College
IW JOC	Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept
JOD	Joint Officer Development
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
MECC	Military Education Coordination Council
OPMEP	Officer Professional Military Education Policy
PAJE	Process of Accreditation of Joint Education
PME	Professional Military Education
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SAE	Special Areas of Emphasis
USSOCOM	United States Special Operation Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

This thesis began with over eight ideas on transformation. Looking closely across these topic areas, a prevailing theme continued to rise to the top--the need for more joint integration and specifically more special operations integration within doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Spanning the entire DOTMLPF spectrum proved too challenging a task for one thesis, so I looked at what was wrong with joint integration and the need to transform across this spectrum. I chose what I believe is the foundation of our service's cultural beliefs and framework--education.

As a student at Army Command and General Staff College, I gained a perspective in joint education that allows a comparison of operational experience to current educational experience. As an Air Force officer in an Army school, I gained an additional perspective on how a fellow service institutes joint education and in particular how the service executes joint education objectives. For years, my operational experience continued to show that as a joint force, we had not obtained the level of integration required to be as effective as we need to be for the current and future operational environments. My educational experience at the Army Command and General Staff College confirmed that this gap was present, and that the officer intermediate education level did not fill this gap.

Before I begin, it is valuable to provide some personal background. This background is not intended to showcase my career but instead to give the reader an

understanding of my background and perspective on the subject. Additionally, I wanted to provide a framework that gives a more honest assessment of the credibility and origination of my ideas. The background also provides a glimpse at my perspective helping to understand my approach to a problem. Additionally, it shows how I may view the current and future operational environment because of my shaping. In all, I believe I might provide a unique perspective to a problem set that I believe is challenging us today--Special Operations integration.

I am an Air Force Special Tactics Officer with fourteen years of joint experience working with joint and coalition Services to include special operations forces (SOF) and various conventional forces (armor, infantry, naval and field artillery, and others). As a young officer, I cut my teeth in Operation Provide Comfort as deployed mission commander providing Combat Search and Rescue support over Northern Iraqi Fly Zone for the previously known Northern Watch. I soon after deployed for Operation Desert Thunder working with Australian and New Zealand SOF to provide a quick reaction force and Combat Search and Rescue capability in an effort to prevent Sadaam Hussein from stepping over the line . . . again. For five years as a young officer, I was a team leader conducting numerous exercises and training iterations with the benefit of deploying, taking my training into a forward operational environment.

I then took a slight sidetrack from operations into training and education. I spent just over one year as the Combat Training Flight commander in the Air Force Education and Training Command gaining insight into the recruiting, selection, education, and training of the Air Force's most challenging ground combat skillsets (Combat Control, Pararescue, Survival Evasion Resistance Escape, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal).

With a daily student load of over 250 students, the flight was responsible for schools, students, and instructors in four time zones. The flight also benefited from the highest attrition rate in Air Force Education and Training Command and subsequently enjoyed a great deal of attention. With this attention, I developed a greater appreciation for training and education and the awesome responsibility of translating what the customer wants into curriculum and instruction that can deliver consistently.

As 9/11 occurred, I served under the Joint Special Operations Command and spent the next four years supporting four deployments equally distributed between Operation's Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. I served as a tactical team leader and deployed mission commander. For the past two years and prior to Army Command and General Staff College, I served as a Squadron Operations Officer fighting a much different war in the Pacific in over ten countries and with a need to work very closely with US Embassies and their country teams. A war fought less through direct action and more through, by, and with host nation counterparts, theater security cooperation, foreign internal defense (FID), and joint combined exchange training.

Currently, I am attending the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During these ten months of study and through personal relationships, I was fortunate enough to gain a deeper understanding of other service branches (particularly the Army). My aforementioned experience in the current operational environment proved that joint integration is essential to the ongoing fight, but how relevant was it to the conventional soldiers of today? Interestingly, I found that the majority of my classmates and officers re-deploying from theater are demanding greater jointness, interagency integration, and special operations understanding. Not surprisingly,

the transformation of today's battlefield necessitates this greater understanding.

Fortunately, it appears that many of our senior leaders believe in this transformation.

Unfortunately, most in the military to include our senior leaders struggle to understand the required formula that will produce successful transformation. The formula, therefore, is not yet effective to create the required future officer.

In the 1990s, a standard Army infantry officer would have little reason (beyond personal desire) to study interagency or SOF capabilities. Today, this knowledge is no longer an advanced need but a basic building block for every military soldier on the battlefield. Complex joint and interagency integration is occurring today with Military Transition Teams (MTTs) in Iraq as Army officers and enlisted are tasked to re-build cities, integrate with available non-governmental organizations, use funds to leverage the local populace, and hand-over efforts to the Department of State. With such complex issues surrounding today's stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations on the battlefield, SOF continues to work quietly throughout the battlefield, and the officers from both cultures attempt to work together to gain success.

The United States continues to wage a global war against a critically thinking, asymmetric enemy that maintains an advantage with freedom of movement and exploitation against our force. Winning the global war on terror (GWOT) is our nation's military number one priority (CJCS 2004, iv). In 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated USSOCOM to lead planning and synchronization of the GWOT (CJCS 2006b, Annex C). Now, USSOCOM finds itself at the forefront of our nation's number one military priority--fighting and winning the GWOT.

As a member of the SOF community, I hold a greater cultural understanding of SOF than those without this background. However, I believe that I have an advantage that provides a unique perspective and prevents complete bias. This advantage comes through my background as an Air Force Special Tactics officer. The advantage of Special Tactics is that our forces must work as conduits between the military services and cultures in order to blend the air and ground environment. Although I grew up in an air-centric culture, my profession has roots in special operations and ground tactics. Existing within a multitude of cultures (air, ground, SOF) provides a certain amount of freedom from entrenched paradigms. My perspective allows for a more non-parochial analysis than the typical Service or SOF officer has.

Cultures are a strong force that guide many of our decisions and are at the foundation of individuals, organizations, and societies. These cultures play an important role in defining the military Services. Each Service and their individuals bring a unique perspective and cultural mindset to the table. This cultural uniqueness is important and allows Services to challenge standard thinking paradigms and consider alternate solutions that others in the joint community might miss. Yet, these cultures also deeply divide our services as we fight for responsibility, money, and power and thus make us unwilling to compromise for the greater good at the risk of losing prominence.

Consequently, culture is both a blessing and a curse. How do we within the Department of Defense (DoD) preserve the strengths of our Service cultures but drive out the negative trends causing us to be a more effective fighting force for the current and future operational environments? First, we turn to education that produces the necessary imprinting of leadership. Although imprinting is an ongoing process, this thesis will focus

only on officers at the field grade level and their exposure to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) at intermediate level education.

By appropriately educating and growing our military leaders, one affects culture and therefore orchestrates the proper blending of joint force leaders to achieve true joint interdependence. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the effectiveness of JPME. Is JPME effectively training our future leaders for the future operational environment? Does JPME effectively integrate Special Operations based on their current and future role as a leading force?

Special Operations is a strong force in the current and projected future operational environment, but JPME does not properly educate conventional and unconventional force integration.

Introduction

Because of the failed Iranian hostage mission in 1984, Congress began a two-year study into the Defense Department to include an examination of SOF. As a result of this investigation, Congress passed the *Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, which led to the creation of USSOCOM.

In 2008, SOF is working unilaterally and jointly with all services and agencies. The presence of SOF is a driving force in current operations executing the GWOT. To prosecute the GWOT, in 2005, the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense agreed that USSOCOM was best suited to take on the role as “the supported combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks” (CJCS 2006b, 29). Today, SOF continue to prove relevancy in the current operational environment, and with the advent of irregular warfare

as the “dominant form of warfare confronting the United States,” SOF will continue to have a leading role (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 36).

Apart from SOF and USSOCOM’s relevancy, military education continues to be “the critical element in officer development” ensuring that “US Armed forces remain capable of defeating today’s threat and tomorrow’s” (CJCS 2005a, 1). Consequently, as the battlefield changes, one expects to see a corollary educational change. Through an increased relevancy and leadership role of special operations, one might expect an increase in special operations presence and role in joint military education, this, however, is not the case in the current educational system.

Beyond USSOCOM’s birth in 1987, the JPME system began conception. In November 1987, Congress reacted to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) as House of Representatives Chairman, Les Aspen, appointed the Honorable Ike Skelton to chair the Panel on Military Education Committee. Seventeen months later in April 1989, the Panel on Military Education published an extensive report on professional military education (PME). To date, this document, better known as The Skelton Report, is still the most current guidance for JPME. During this panel study, USSOCOM remained a fledgling combatant command that had been forced upon the DoD, so little thought was given to its role and integration into JPME. The Skelton Report, therefore, did not mention or include special operations within its JPME guidance. In fact, this document does not mention special operations or USSOCOM anywhere.

Subsequent to the GNA and Skelton Report, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) routinely updates and publishes the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). As an instruction to the Services, this document provides the standards

for JPME that all Services who desire a JPME rating must follow. Essentially, the OPMEP is the only policy that Services follow to teach joint education within their service schools. Unlike the Skelton Report, the OPMEP is a living, changing document last updated in 2005. Remarkably, however, like the Skelton Report, the OPMEP is almost absent discussion of special operations. As an example, the current OPMEP mentions SOF three times in 136 pages--none of which refers to Service school JPME.

The importance of the Skelton Report in today's JPME is paramount, and the OPMEP is a direct reflection of this guidance. Based on the timeline, it is not surprising that the Skelton Report lacks special operations guidance regarding joint service integration. What is surprising is that although USSOCOM's relevancy has greatly increased and is taking lead in the global operational environment for the DoD, Service education expanded to include effective integration of and education about special operations. Eighteen years have passed since the Skelton Report, and the OPMEP continues to remain strangely silent regarding the joint integration and education of SOF. In fact, beyond the individual efforts of USSOCOM and the Services to integrate SOF into PME, no guidance exists.

This lack of integration comes at a time when DoD believes it has achieved a high level of success in Service joint education and is aggressively moving on to work the next important target--interagency integration. By the OPMEP, joint Service integration meets current standards. By obtaining the proper student to instructor ratio as defined by the Skelton Report and through teaching the accredited joint learning standards, DoD and the Services are, by definition, meeting the intent of JPME. However, these integration standards apply to the Services and are not SOF. This is a major shortfall.

A continual problem with the definition of “jointness” is that when considering integration, SOF is sometimes an afterthought. Because USSOCOM is not a service, it does not have equal representation within the Services to influence joint education. Even though USSOCOM is not a service, no one can argue that SOF plays a leading role in today’s military and the current global, irregular warfare environment. By recognizing USSOCOM’s roles, strengths, and capabilities in the current and future operational environment, DoD must revamp policy and guidance to effectively integrate special operations into the whole of JPME.

Primary Research Question

The primary question that this thesis will answer is the following: Is Special Operations adequately integrated into Joint Professional Military Education?

Secondary Research Questions

To answer the primary question, several secondary questions require attention and discussion. Are special operations relevant to the current and future operational environment? How does the emerging concept of irregular warfare drive special operations integration with conventional forces? Does JPME guidance include special operations integration? How are Services currently integrating special operations into JPME? Is SOF integration sufficient, and if not, what needs to change?

Assumptions

To properly address the issue of JPME and the irregular warfare environment, several assumptions will guide the scope and focus of this thesis:

1. The fundamentals of current national military strategy and anticipated future operational environment of irregular warfare will remain operationally viable until at least 2025 as the QDR states.

2. Irregular warfare is complex and requires adaptive, capable leaders to adequately understand the complexity so as to fight it.

3. Leaders throughout Congress and DoD desire to understand the emerging operational environment and seek answers to gaps and challenges. Specifically, United States leadership understands the need for transformation and seeks the specific requirements for this transformation.

4. JPME is currently the best and most appropriate system to integrate and blend Service cultures and cultivate future leaders.

5. Congress and DoD leadership consider the current JPME, Level 1 adequate in addressing joint integration as defined by “Service” integration/ratios.

6. Congress and DoD recognize the importance of military education in shaping the culture of our Services and are willing to examine outdated paradigms within JPME to make changes better suited for the contemporary and future operational environments.

7. Leaders are able to look beyond inter-service interests and make non-parochial changes for the purpose of JPME.

Finally, this thesis assumes that USSOCOM desires to play an increased role in not only its own operator’s personnel education but also in ensuring special operations integration into the service schools. Therefore, the author will assume there are no limits to SOF or other Service personnel/instructors required in this thesis’ recommendations.

Limitations

There are several limitations to the scope of research, methods, and applications. Primarily, the ongoing requirements of the Army Command and General Staff College compete with the research and completion of this thesis. Additionally, the selection of the final thesis topic came very late in the year after seven months of work on a different topic on military education. The author chose to change topics after a personal interview with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Acting Director, Brigadier General Michael Rounds.

Then, how do you scope what we're not getting at? Because that's the first problem. It's not just good enough to say that we're not getting at it adequately but *what specifically are we not getting at, how do you scope it, and how do you share that with the community* so we can make sure there's a consistent adjustment across the joint military education system [emphasis added]. (Rounds 2008)

The author realized that pursuing basic changes in the existing OPMEP was not enough. The author also realized that without identifying a significant idea or concept, then transformation of JPME and the existing institutions would continue at its current pace and on an errant path. After further study, the author believed that the true gap and discovery was in the lack of special operations integration throughout DoD PME. The importance of these revelations and discoveries were strong enough to warrant a late change in topic and an exponential increase in effort and writing. Therefore, although the ideas and concepts for this thesis are sound, more time might allow for a more robust development and argument. Like any long work of research and product, time is a continuously limiting factor.

Another limitation is the availability of a central point of contact for irregular warfare above the service levels. Because the future operational environment and

irregular warfare were crucial aspects in this thesis, understanding and defining them in relation to SOF and non-SOF forces integration was important. Additionally, understanding and defining irregular warfare proved challenging. Although services and command components are establishing working groups and offices to define and analyze irregular warfare, the components and commands keep analysis at their level. Without an overall agency or office in charge, the DoD implements irregular warfare efforts at the Service level.

This limitation recognized a critical fault within the military and DoD. Since irregular warfare requires increased synchronization and interdependence, an agency above service and command levels is required to synchronize efforts among all services and commands. The fact that this designation has not occurred is an observation that limits the ability of this thesis to quickly assimilate DoD's direction and implementation of education for the future operational environment of irregular warfare.

Significance

This study is significant to the current and future operational environment of irregular warfare to address gaps in special operations integration into Service JPME standards necessary to train future leaders in this environment. Because the future operational environment requires joint military and interagency integration on a global scale to combat an adapting and flexible enemy, future leaders must first understand and reflect on the nature of irregular warfare and the military requirements to fight it and special operations role in that fight. Beyond the individual officer's desire to self-educate, the military's PME standards must address special operations role in emerging operational environments to include irregular warfare and JPME's lack of special

operations integration within joint education standards. The synchronization of these efforts will require a global effort of special operations and conventional forces working increasingly side by side. The effort begins with effective education in order to produce leaders and cultures that can effectively blend the future joint force into a truly capable irregular warfare fighting force.

Conclusion

The increasing complexity and global nature of irregular warfare requires leaders who understand and command the joint force in a fluid, asymmetric environment. The current doctrine and education of military leaders fail to address the growing relevancy and required integration of special operations into the total joint force. Without this understanding, the United States military is not properly educating the leaders required for the future operational environment.

This thesis attempts to address the existing gaps in SOF/Service joint integration through various presentations and chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background of the author and his reasons for pursuing this thesis topic. Additionally, this first chapter provides the overview of the topic and the thesis' questions, assumptions, and limitations. Chapter 2 explores the literature used in completing this project. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and approach providing the reader an overview of the research design. Chapter 4 is the essence of this thesis and provides the analysis of special operations relevancy and inclusion into existing PME. Finally, chapter 5 provides recommendations at various levels noting a potential way-ahead for special operations inclusion into JPME.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 1 addresses the background and introduction to this thesis while the following chapter introduces the baseline of literature used to conduct the research for this thesis. The following chapter provides an overview of the literature used according to the following topic areas:

1. Special Operations: Relevancy and Irregular Warfare Role
2. Irregular Warfare and the Future Operational Environment
3. JPME Background and Current Role

Special Operations: Relevancy and Irregular Warfare Role

USSOCOM published its *Special Operations Command History* in 2007 providing the initial framework necessary in building the case for special operations relevancy through the history and analysis of USSOCOM and its units. Specifically, this document provides insight into the Service friction and the subsequent Congressional pressure that led to USSOCOM's creation. From USSOCOM's inception in 1987 to today, SOF shows an increase in mission, money, manpower, and equipment. Most importantly, this document reflects USSOCOM's missions within DoD and an increasing role of relevancy to the entire DoD.

To expand on USSOCOM's relevancy in irregular warfare, the author pulled from the Secretary of Defense's *National Military Security Policy on the War on Terror* showing the President and the Secretary of Defense's designation of USSOCOM as the lead for the GWOT. This thesis then draws a comparison to the GWOT and nature of

irregular warfare. This comparison takes on a new dimension as the author reviews the current USSOCOM Commander's, Admiral Olson's, thoughts on USSOCOM's familiarity and ability to lead the emerging irregular warfare challenge by highlighting his comments in a key-note speech made during a joint conference on training and education called "*Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare.*"

Irregular Warfare and the Future Operational Environment

As an emerging form of warfare, the formal definition and nature of irregular warfare is in development. As DoD strives to understand irregular warfare, institutions, organizations, and current literature strive to define and shape the development of irregular warfare.

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)* is the CJCS's leading document for joint operations concepts and describes "how joint forces are expected to operate across the range of military operations in 2012-2025" (U.S. Department of Defense 2005a, vii). Although broad in scope, its purpose is to "lead force development and employment" for the future joint force (U.S. Department of Defense 2005a, vii).

Central to the theme of the *CCJO* is:

1. How the joint force is expected to operate in the future
2. A systems view of the environment
3. Fundamental actions of the joint force commander and key characteristics of the future joint force (U.S. Department of Defense 2005a, vii)

Notably, the *CCJO* defines how the future joint force will operate as:

1. Act from multiple directions in multiple domains concurrently
2. Conduct integrated and interdependent actions

3. Project and Sustain the Force
4. Act directly upon perceived key elements and processes in the target system
5. Control tempo
6. Transition quickly and smoothly among the various actions
7. Manage perceptions and expectations
8. Act discriminately (U.S. Department of Defense 2005a, 16-20).

Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics of this force.



Figure 1. Characteristics of the Future Joint Force

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concepts for Joint Operations (CCJO)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 20.

To summarize, the *CCJO* provides the framework necessary to begin analysis of a future operational environment that is complex and irregular in nature requiring joint forces that operate beyond current paradigms requiring integration and interdependence. This joint force requires smooth and quick transitions within a complex environment with an additional need for discrimination and political sensitivity (U.S. Department of Defense 2005a, 20). The *CCJO* reviews DOTMLPF listing “leadership and education” as a key future requirement stating that this future “requires knowledgeable, empowered, innovative, and decisive leaders, capable of leading the networked joint force to success in fluid and perhaps chaotic operating environments” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005a, 24). Such leaders require education that expands critical thinking and understanding of the developing operational environments and most importantly expands the knowledge of the forces required in this environment. As the joint force requires growth to synergize all governmental organizations, the United States military leadership must also develop an understanding of these organizations--most notably special operations and their current and growing role in this irregular environment.

As the *CCJO* introduced the term “irregular” into the emerging challenges for the United States, the term “irregular warfare” took on greater meaning in its inclusion in the Secretary of Defense’s *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006*. The *QDR* is a comprehensive document that guides DoD and its Services to provide a framework for transformation in the next 20 years. The purpose of the *QDR* is “to help shape the process of change to provide the United States of America with strong, sound and effective warfighting capabilities in the decades ahead” (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, ix). This document is a powerful guide for the DoD and its Services providing a roadmap for

transformation and framing the future operational environment. “This QDR defines two fundamental imperatives for the Department of Defense” (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 1).

Continuing to reorient the Department’s capabilities and forces to be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years. Implementing enterprise-wide change to ensure that organizational structures, processes and procedures effectively support its strategic direction. (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 1)

Essentially, “the Department’s senior leadership sets out where the Department of Defense currently is and the direction . . . it needs to go in fulfilling . . . responsibilities to the American people” (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, iii).

The *QDR* gives permanence to the term irregular warfare. Specifically, the *QDR* lists irregular warfare as one of five specific areas of emphasis requiring focus and a roadmap to the future (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 2). The prominence of irregular warfare is apparent in the following quote from the *QDR*:

In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long-duration operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 36)

Irregular warfare will exist for “the foreseeable future” and will continue to be a leading player for the military forces (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 36).

As DoD works to characterize irregular warfare, the *QDR* provides the initial view of irregular warfare development and overlap with additional DoD focus areas. Figure 2 shows the prescribed DoD focus areas. Most notable is the shift from traditional challenges to irregular challenges. Looking closely at this figure reveals an overlap of irregular challenges across the focus area spectrum. This overlap reflects the increasingly

likelihood that an enemy, who cannot match the United States in force-on-force traditional warfare, will leverage a myriad of challenges in order to offset the strength of the United States military and erode the long-term support. Essentially, the enemy will leverage total, protracted warfare to exploit weaknesses and destroy the will of the people. Irregular warfare spans all focus areas simultaneously requiring a transformation of existing Service culture and leadership.




Figure 2. DoD Revised Focus Areas: Operationalizing National Defense Strategy
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 19.

Following the *QDR*, the Defense Department identified the need to define irregular warfare. Without current doctrine to guide this emerging form of warfare, the

DoD chartered USSOCOM to lead the development of the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept (IW JOC)* in 2007.

The *IW JOC* was developed and published in September 2007 and was a joint effort led by USSOCOM and developed with the Combatant Commands, Services, and Joint Staff. This thesis explores the details of the *IW JOC* in chapter 4, but as an overview, the *IW JOC* reflects how the United States military must pursue irregular warfare, and that the nature of this warfare includes the following:

1. Influencing foreign governments and populations is a complex and inherently political activity
2. Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms
3. Waging protracted irregular warfare depends on building global capability and capacity (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 1).

The above statements reflect a complex, sensitive environment requiring cognitive influence of the people involved and conducted on a global scale requiring persistent, regular presence.

Finally, the *IW JOC* intends to provide guidance for future joint force commanders in conducting protracted irregular warfare, guide the development and integration of DoD military concepts and capabilities, and provide a basis for future debate and development in irregular warfare (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 5). “The overall desired end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW [irregular warfare] and a balanced approach to warfighting that allows the joint force to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare” (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 5).

In addition to the *IW JOC*, there are wide varieties of documents outlining the future operational environment. The CJCS recognized the importance of such a framework and established the Joint Experimentation, Transformation, and Concepts Division. The CJCS Joint Experimentation, Transformation, and Concepts Division “supports and facilitates the transformation efforts of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by acting as the primary agent for developing and monitoring the implementation plans for joint experimentation and concept development” (CJCS 2008a). This division leads the transformation efforts for DoD as it faces irregular warfare and the future operational environment. Because of this leading role, it is important to note the literature and documents that this division uses as it leads DoD in synergizing and overseeing these critical components.

Figure 3 reflects the Joint Experimentation, Transformation, and Concepts Division’s current reference list as it charts future joint warfare. Interestingly, the Joint Experimentation, Transformation, and Concepts Division lists as its first reference the *USSOCOM Capstone Concept for Special Operations 2006 (USSOCOM CCSO)*. This use of a USSOCOM document as a leading reference for DoD and CJCS transformation is a telling sign that special operations plays an important role in the emerging operational environment. *USSOCOM CCSO* offers a good source of information defining key elements of the future operational environment and the requirement of “integration of all instruments of national power and the cooperation of all government agencies and coalition partners” (US Special Operations Command 2006, 4). A continual theme throughout the CCSO demands that “bold new ideas must guide the future . . . [un]constrained by outdated policies or organizational imperatives” (US Special

Operations Command O 2006, 5). This document provides a basis for irregular warfare fought on a global scale requiring evolving and critical thinking beyond our current Service culture and paradigms.




Figure 3. Joint Experimentation, Transformation, and Concepts Division Reference List
Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Experimentation, Transformation, and Concepts Division Website, <http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/index.html> (accessed 4 May, 2008).

Additionally, the CCSO provides initial insight into the general development for SOF officers and enlisted required to meet these challenges (figure 4). The below

competencies reflect the need for a multi-faceted individual capable of visualizing, understanding, leading, and executing in complex, asymmetric environments. This figure is useful as a comparative tool against the existing conventional force operator. As irregular warfare grows to affect the entire joint force, unconventional and conventional competencies must blend. As an innovator in irregular warfare, USSOCOM highlights potential competencies that are critical to both special operations force and the entire military.




Figure 4. Joint Special Operations Forces Competency Model
Source: US Special Operations Command, *Capstone Concept for Special Operations (CCSO)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 13.

The USSOCOM *Capstone Concept for Special Operations* 2006 provides a valuable glimpse at a command created to fight irregular warfare. This glimpse provides insight into the future operational environment and the challenges the United States faces as it builds a joint force capable of fighting and winning irregular warfare.

Additionally, the *United States Joint Forces Command's Joint Operating Environment (JOE): Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030* provides the most thorough analysis of the future operating environment. The *JOE* discusses “trends, shocks, challenges, and military implications [to provide a] ‘foothold in the future’ for the wider joint and service experimentation community to consider when exploring new concepts, technologies, organizing principles, and methods to effectively manage this future” (U.S. Joint Forces Command 2007, 1). As a general overview to the *JOE*, figure 5 depicts the potential results of trends, shocks, and variables to the future operational environment and the implications to the United States military.




Figure 5. Joint Operational Environment Terminology

Source: U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Environment (JOE): Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030* (Suffolk, VA: Government Printing Office, 2007), 3.

The Joint Operational Environment defines and scopes the future operational environment. Because the joint operational environment is constantly evolving in nature, this document provides a stable platform to compare other elements that define the future operational environment and ensure consistency within variables (for example complexity, globalization, and others).

The above literature reflects the current view of a future operational environment that is asymmetric and irregular in nature. Chapter 4 uses this literature to frame the argument that future warfare is complex, asymmetric and categorized as irregular.

Joint Professional Military Education--Background and Current Role

In the context of researching a broad topic such as JPME several sources provide the foundation and background required. To gain context into JPME, this thesis uses the historical literature that established the guidelines for JPME. Additionally, this thesis uses current JPME guidance from Congress and the CJCS. Finally, this thesis benefits from multiple interviews with current policy setters and enforcers within the CJCS. This thesis addresses the full spectrum of JPME: from its genesis to today's current guidance and direction.

The foundation of JPME begins with the Congressional mandate that drove more “jointness” from the DoD--*the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. As public law, Congress enacted the GNA in October 1986. The purpose of the GNA was:

To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to *improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations* and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes [emphasis added]. (U.S. Congress 1986, 100 STAT. 992)

Subsequently, the GNA spells out joint officer requirements and gives guidance regarding joint officer education:

The Secretary of Defense shall require that each Department of Defense school concerned with professional military education periodically review and revise its

curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on:

- (1) joint matters; and
- (2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments. (U.S. Congress 1986, 100 STAT. 1027)

Because of the GNA and the initial limited guidance of joint education, Congress appointed Congressman Ike Skelton to lead a *Report of the Panel on Military Education* in 1987. Two years later in April 1989, the panel published this report, better known as The Skelton Report. The Skelton Report is an assessment of DoD's PME system and determines whether this system is sufficient in developing officers competent in strategy and joint matters. It is important to note that in 1987 the term "joint" implied "multi-service" and did not extend to include forces that exist outside of their service commands (for example special operations).

The Skelton Report is an extensive report that took two years and over 200 pages to publish. In all, the panel makes nine key recommendations:

1. Establish a PME framework for DoD schools that specifies and relates the primary educational objectives at each PME level.
2. Improve the quality of faculty by amending present law to facilitate hiring civilian faculty and through actions by the CJCS, and the service chiefs to ensure that only high-quality military officers are assigned to faculties.
3. Establish a two-phase Joint Specialist Officer (JSO) education process with Phase I taught in service colleges and a follow-on, temporary-duty Phase II taught at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).

4. Adopt the proposal developed by the CJCS, that the National War College be converted to a National Center for Strategic Studies, as both a research and educational institution.

5. At the senior service colleges, make national military strategy the primary focus and increase the mix by service of both the military faculty and military students.

6. Implement a substantive Capstone course that includes the study of national security strategy and national military strategy.

7. Review the Navy military education system to determine whether Navy officer should and can attend both intermediate and senior colleges and whether each Naval War College school should have a more distinct curriculum.

8. Establish the position of Director of Military Education on the staff of the Chairman, JCS, to support his responsibilities for JPME and for formulating policies to coordinate all military education.

9. Require students at both intermediate and senior PME schools to complete frequent essay-type examinations and to write papers and reports that are thoroughly reviewed, critiqued, and graded by faculty (U.S. Congress 1989, 2-7).

As a summary, the panel highlights that the “major subject of professional military education should be the employment of combat forces, the conduct of war” (U.S. Congress 1989, 7). The report further stipulates “the most fundamental recommendation of the panel is that this joint specialist education [as listed in recommendation number three] should be accomplished in a joint school” (U.S. Congress 1989, 8).

In all, the panel highlights the importance and criticality of jointness within PME targeted toward the leadership and successful employment of forces to conduct war. The

recommendation and guidelines provided in the Skelton Report are important for this study in order to understand current service JPME. It is equally important in order to determine whether current education meets the intent of the Skelton Report as it relates to existing guidance and policy. To date, the Skelton Report is still DoD's leading guidance for PME. Today, additional guidance still flows from the original author, Representative Ike Skelton, who currently maintains a personal and professional interest in the military education system (Rounds 2008). Beyond the physical document and its text, Congressman Ike Skelton is the leading force behind JPMEs continued execution and the standards that direct it. Today, the Skelton Report and Congressman Ike Skelton are the sole elements above DoD guiding JPME.

Within DoD, several elements serve to influence, guide, and direct PME. In November 2005, the CJCS published *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development (JOD)*. As a result of the *CCJO*, the Chairman recognized in order to create the required joint force specified in the *CCJO* that "leaders of the envisioned future force must also be developed" (CJCS 2005b, iv). "Transformative approaches to joint officer development are required to ensure that joint leaders with the proper mix of joint and Service leader competencies have the training, education, and experience to successfully lead the CCJO-envisioned force" (CJCS 2005b, iv). The *JOD* establishes recommendations for future education and training direction for the joint force exploring the need to educate and transform future joint leaders. This thesis will focus on two aspects of the *JOD*: (1) the requirement for skilled joint warfighters and (2) the use of JPME as a pillar for implementing *JOD* and the *CCJO*.

The *JOD* defines one of its three joint competencies for an officer as a “skilled joint warfighter.” To effectively leverage this skill, an officer must be capable of “integrating joint, interagency, and multi-national capabilities within physical, virtual, and human domains in time, space, and purpose . . . [and additionally] possessing the functional core competency of fighting a joint force, while operating in a transparent, fluid, and networked environment” (CJCS 2005b, 4).

To instill this and other critical joint competencies, the *JOD* leverages JPME. “JPME is at the heart of JOD, as schoolhouses are the petri dishes for organizational culture” (CJCS 2005b, 5), JPME is “the key element of the transformation” of the joint force (CJCS 2005b, 5).

Nevertheless, even with the recognition of JPME’s importance, the *JOD* prescribes that the current model of JPME remains relatively unchanged. Throughout the *JOD*, guidance relates to expanding the current officer education to become “skilled joint warfighters who are strategically minded, and critical thinkers,” but does adequately address the significant culture shift required to conduct the required integration.

Beyond the *JOD*, the CJCS issues direct guidance and direction through policy. The CJCS assigns the J7 Directorate to manage JPME. The CJCS J7 manages JPME through the OPMEP. The OPMEP provides the guidance and learning objectives for all Service schools and establishes requirements for JPME.

In December 2005, the CJCS last updated the OPMEP. The United States engineered these policies four years into the fight against the GWOT. Consequently, these policies reflect the most current guidance for the Armed Services and the joint education process.

Although Services provide their own Service specific PME, the CJCS provides vision for Service PME through the OPMEP. “PME needs to continue to build an officer that understands the strategic implications of tactical actions and the consequences that strategic actions have on the tactical environment” (CJCS 2005a, 2). The OPMEP expands on the importance of joint integration in PME. “Service delivery of PME, taught in a joint context, instills basic Service core competencies; JPME instills joint core competencies. JPME should position an officer to recognize and operate in tactical, operational, and strategic levels of national security” (CJCS 2005a, 2). This quote provides the foundation for JPME existing alongside Service education. The challenge, as this thesis later describes, is defining the *OPMEP*’s intention of ‘joint core competencies’ and their applicability in the emerging irregular warfare environment.

As services develop and distribute curriculum, they use the *OPMEP* for guidance to meet JPME standards. For service intermediate-level college (ILC), the *OPMEP* lists the following joint learning areas and objectives for JPME Level 1 accreditation:

1. Learning Area 1--National Military Capabilities, Command Structure and Strategic Guidance
2. Learning Area 2--Joint Doctrine and Concepts
3. Learning Area 3--Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War
4. Learning Area 4--Joint Planning and Execution Processes
5. Learning Area 5--Information Operations, Command and Control (C2) and Battlespace Awareness (CJCS 2005a, E-C-1 to E-C-3).

In addition to the OPMEP, CJCS uses the Process of Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) team to assess joint standards within Service schools ILC programs. The PAJE team visits ILC schools to review curriculum and instruction and validates the schools JPME program. Through review, analysis, and personal interviews with instructors and students, the PAJE team assesses the school's intent and effectiveness in educating JPME standards. The author was fortunate to take part in a PAJE team accreditation visit as a part of the PAJE team interview with sister service personnel. Additionally, the author obtained a one-on-one interview with the PAJE team chief. These interviews provided insight into the accreditation process. Special operations experience was noticeably absent on the CJCS team. Additionally, the PAJE team never inquired about special operations or its integration but focused on Service integration.

In addition to the PAJE team, the author gained an interview with the CJCS J7 Acting Director, Brigadier General Michael Rounds. Through this interview, the author learned of the existing process to provide input and challenges of transforming JPME. Additionally, the Skelton Report of 1989 and Congressman Ike Skelton directly guide current JPME standards and implementation. Finally, General Rounds provided insight into the CJCS, ADM Callon's, current way-ahead for JPME--interagency integration and an increase in "regional understanding and cultural awareness" (Rounds 2008).

Within USSOCOM, the author interviewed the current President of the Joint Special Operations University who is a member of the Senior Executive Service, Dr. Brian Maher. Additionally, the author received inputs from the USSOCOM J7 Education Branch, Mr. Boyd Ballard. Each member contributed to the understanding of JPME and the integration of SOF within the existing educational system.

As trends of warfare demand better synthesis between services and agencies, the *OPMEP* takes on increased importance as the only document that usurps individual Service guidance for PME. This thesis will explore the Skelton Report and the *OPMEP* as the current education guidance for shaping our future leaders. In order to understand the current level of integration between special operations and Service conventional forces, this thesis examines the primary literature used by DoD and its Services to teach JPME.

Conclusion

Through various literature and personal interviews, the author collected and analyzed the aforementioned resources. What is apparent in this review is that the services and DoD are looking into the future with increased concern on joint and interagency integration. But as irregular warfare moves to the forefront of the nation's wars and USSOCOM increases its role in fighting irregular warfare and the GWOT, today's education system reflects a significant lack of special operations integration and the required blending needed to guide the future joint force. In chapter 3, this thesis explores the methodology and design used in conducting this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

The previous chapter provided an overview of the literature and research documents used for this thesis. The following chapter reflects the framework and methodology used for research in pursuing whether special operations is appropriately integrated into JPME so that our future leaders can effectively face irregular warfare.

This thesis provides research, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning current DoD education standards and their ability to properly educate emerging leaders in accordance with the current and future operational environment. In the process of conducting this research, the author noted a significant gap in joint education that lacked the appropriate inclusion of special operations due to their increased role in irregular warfare and the future operational environment.

Thesis Framework Overview

The framework for this thesis methodology is as follows:

1. Show special operations growing relevancy and shift from a fledgling command to a leading force in current/future operational environment of irregular warfare
2. Provide basic understanding of irregular warfare and specifically relate its growing dominance in the future operational environment (twenty plus years)
3. Show global irregular warfare requires *total* joint force integration--blending of special operations and conventional forces

4. Show that education is an effective means of transforming cultures and institutions
5. Analyze current state of special operations within Service JPME
6. Answer the primary research question
7. Provide recommendations at appropriate levels to enable change/transformation

Design Specifics

This thesis begins by studying the origin of special operations through USSOCOM. By studying its genesis, the thesis hopes to give the reader insight into the relevancy of this command and its forces. Additionally, the thesis continues to expound on USSOCOM's history leading up to Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Through the exploration of this brief history leading into today's most prevalent operations, this thesis shows an increase in relevancy of SOF, specifically USSOCOM. Finally, the thesis explores the unique role that USSOCOM now plays in leading the GWOT and its increasing role in the emerging dominant form of warfare--irregular warfare. By following a consistent and growing thread of relevancy, this thesis works to prove USSOCOM and special operations current and future involvement in warfare and prove the need for an increased blending of special operations and conventional forces. No longer is integration of service conventional and SOF a desire--it is a requirement.

After establishing USSOCOM relevancy and the need for increased joint force integration, this study aims to define irregular warfare and the emerging future operational environment. As the thesis expands on irregular warfare, it directly correlates special operations to irregular warfare, showing that USSOCOM is viewed as the leading DoD proponent for irregular warfare. Additionally, this thesis reviews the current

USSOCOM commander's correlation of special operations and irregular warfare by reviewing USSOCOM's resident expertise and familiarity with irregular warfare. The USSOCOM Commander's alliterations lend credibility to USSOCOM as an irregular warfare leader in the emerging operational environment.

After establishing USSOCOM as a relevant and capable force leading irregular warfare, the thesis aims to define the necessary blending of SOF and conventional forces to establish what the *QDR* 2006 defines as "the new breed of warrior" requiring a force "as proficient in irregular operations . . . as they are today in high-intensity combat" (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 42). This breed must "take on more of the tasks performed by today's special operations forces" (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 42). This thesis aims to show that joint is no longer Service specific but must include special operations integration.

After proving the necessity of conventional and unconventional force blending, this thesis shows that education is a required means of transforming cultures and institutions. As special operations and conventional integration proves paramount, education is a critical mechanism to reach synergy and promote change in culture and the environment.

Following the proof that education is an effective means of transforming future leaders to understand and operate in a blended culture, this study analyzes if current Service JPME contains sufficient special operations integration. The study analyzes current JPME guidance in the *OPMEP* and Congressional laws and policies as listed in the GNA of 1986 and the Skelton Report of 1989 to determine the status of special

operations inclusion within JPME. Additionally, the research examines if future transformation in JPME reflects change or inclusion of special operations integration.

If research proves a lack of effective special operations integration into current Service JPME curriculum and instruction, the thesis will make recommendations for change. Realizing the difficulties of institutionalizing required JPME change across Services, this thesis addresses potential recommendations at four levels: Congressional, DoD, CJCS, and USSOCOM. In order for change to occur, these levels must transform.

Conclusion

In addressing potential gaps in a long-standing process like JPME, it is critical to implement an effective research methodology and design with concrete literature to support the proposed concepts. Special operations integration with existing Service culture is paramount for successful future warfare. The next chapter takes the design methodology from chapter 3 and applies analysis using the literature from chapter 2 presenting answer to the primary and secondary questions of this thesis. The combined effect is to understand the importance of special operations and their increasing role within DoD as compared to their non-existent role within JPME.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long-duration operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 36)

Introduction

As millions of people watched shocked by the tragic attacks of al Qaeda on 11 September 2001, many quietly admitted that things would never be the same for Americans. The scope and nature of these asymmetric attacks ushered in an awareness of a new character of conflict--Irregular Warfare. As the characteristics of warfare morph, many organizations work to define what the future might look like. At the same time, the military transforms DOTMLPF to meet these emerging threats. As Services struggle to define irregular warfare, USSOCOM is attempting to take the lead. The very nature of irregular warfare is inherent in SOF core skills and missions. However, now that the nation recognizes irregular warfare as a “major and pervasive form of warfare,” irregular warfare is no longer just a SOF problem but a total-force problem requiring all services and agencies to unite and integrate to fight it (CJCS 2007, x). At the center of this required integration is JPME. This chapter explores special operation’s past, current, and future relevancy within DoD and exposes current gaps in JPME transformation and joint integration.

Brief History and Evolution of Special Operations

Since its creation in 1987, USSOCOM has supported conventional forces and conducted independent special operations throughout the world, participating in all major combat operations. (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 1)

Before reflecting on special operations role in today's and future operational environments, it is important to understand the development and establishment of special operations, specifically USSOCOM, over the last twenty years. The purpose of this subtext is to explore the foundation of USSOCOM and the history that necessitated a genesis beyond the Services' control and their existing SOF.

In April 1980, the DoD failed and aborted a mission to rescue fifty-three American hostages in Iran known as Operation EAGLE CLAW. With the collision of two aircraft and eight servicemen dead, commanders aborted an in-progress mission at the landing site codenamed Desert One. This operation was a very public tragedy culminating over ten years of distrust between conventional forces and SOF (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5).

As a response to this failure by the Services, the DoD appointed an investigative panel led by Admiral James L. Holloway. Within the Defense Department, the Holloway Commission's findings led to the creation of a Special Operations Advisory Panel and a counterterrorist joint task force postured to ensure the United States military could jointly execute actions against terrorist around the world (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5).

However, this limited change was not enough. Outside of the DoD, there were those that still believed that the military had not changed enough and required not only change but also direction. In 1983, Senator Barry Goldwater initiated a two-year study of

the Defense Department to include SOF (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5). Later that same year, the invasion of Grenada served to further highlight low intensity conflict and the ongoing issues with joint integration (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5).

These events of 1983 served as a catalyst for DoD to create the Joint Special Operations Agency in January 1984--an agency that did not have operational or command authority over any SOF (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5). Again, the DoD had not provided SOF with authority or control.

Parallel to the Defense Department's tepid efforts, Senator Sam Nunn, Senator William Cohen, and Representative Daniel "were determined to overhaul SOF" (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5). The strong belief in the relevancy of SOF framed the groundwork for change. Congressman Daniel best summarized these beliefs stating that he "had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem" (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5). In addition to service disinterests, Senator Nunn targeted the Service's practice of re-appropriating money tagged for SOF to non-SOF programs. Moreover, Senator Cohen targeted an organization and chain of command for special operations (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 6).

The next year in October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," a two-year review of the United States military structure, which subsequently led to the *Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 6).

Prior to the GNA, Congressional SOF advocates introduced reform bills. In May 1986, Senators Cohen and Nunn introduced a bill that called for a joint SOF military organization and an office within the DoD that could protect funding and drive policy (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 6). Representative Daniel's proposal pushed for further reform demanding "a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the Secretary of Defense" (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 6). The power that Congress was willing to give USSOCOM reflects the potential importance and relevancy of special operations as a military force.

As an answer to Congress, the Pentagon, led by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, opposed the proposed bills and instead offered a new SOF Command headed by a three-star general. Congress conceded but insisted on a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general that would lead all of SOF (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 7). Finally, the bill added Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) funds which earmarked and protected SOF funding. The result was a command that could hold equal weight to the geographic combatant commanders with a specific funding line but would not have power equal to the other Service branches.

In all, Congressional action was required to force the Services and the DoD to recognize special operations relevancy and their requirement for their growth. USSOCOM was conceived out of the burnt ashes of Desert One, but absent of military service harmony. Today, USSOCOM continues to gain momentum and advocacy past that of the 1980s and 1990s, but friction still exists.

Irregular Warfare--A Brief Overview

The context of *irregular warfare* (IW) is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. (CJCS 2008b, xi)

As USSOCOM grows in relevancy, its mission continues to grow across the full spectrum of operations. Most noticeably, USSOCOM fights and synchronizes the war on terror across the globe. Similarly, Commander USSOCOM is posturing to take the lead in another area of asymmetric conflict--irregular warfare. The following subtext contains a brief overview of irregular warfare with an endstate not to specifically define irregular warfare but to reflect upon its complex nature and the potential forces required to fight it.

Irregular warfare in the joint military community is a relatively new doctrinal term. So new, in fact, that it did not exist in joint doctrine until DoD released the definition in a recent February 2008, update of Joint Publication 3-0. In essence, irregular warfare reflects a departure from force-on-force attrition warfare and moves to gain influence over a population's will favoring indirect, asymmetric methods.

This future environment challenges an officer's understanding of the enemy and expands in complexity as it crosses both state and non-state boundaries. In addition to geography, irregular warfare is complex and "rooted in global and regional ideological and political struggles" (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 16). Within this environment, the enemy will fight the United States unconventionally because our conventional military power has become too difficult to defeat. Thus, the enemy chooses a "hybrid of irregular, disruptive, catastrophic, and traditional capabilities" in order to achieve their objectives (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 16).

Fighting across the security challenge spectrum, the enemy forces the fight into an asymmetric, irregular model. Figure 6 depicts an overview of the Joint Operational Concept Logic for Irregular Warfare.




Figure 6. Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept Logic Overview
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operations Concept (JOC)* Version 1.0, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 2.

As the enemy adapts to fight asymmetrically pulling the United States military outside its comfort zone, the result is protracted irregular warfare designed to exploit the United States at its weakest points strategically, politically, and emotionally. The enemy gains advantage during a protracted campaign by believing that United States political

and social willpower is limited. Thus, the United States faces an immediate challenge of engaging in a drawn-out, dirty fight that must be compelling enough to persuade other nations (to include the United States) to stay engaged. Additionally, the fight requires a total joint force solution within DoD that includes a synergy and balance between conventional and unconventional forces never before required. The global conflict will be of long-duration fought by conventional and unconventional forces in mutually supporting roles influencing the will of the people over the long-term. Figure 6 on the previous page, if anything, provides a context of the complexity of the logic of irregular warfare.

The complexity and uncertainty of the irregular warfare is precisely what this thesis is trying to introduce as a problem set for the near future. Again, the purpose is not to make the reader an expert on irregular warfare, but simply define a rough framework for this environment with the more detailed goal of defining the required forces necessary to lead and fight irregular warfare.

Special Operations Command--Irregular Warfare Specialists

As the Iranian hostage rescue mission failed in 1980, a subsequent study of joint service and special operations integration led to the GNA of 1986. Reluctantly, Services conceded to Congressional Law, and formed USSOCOM. In its short twenty-year history, USSOCOM has grown in power and influence within the DoD by building the unique skills required to synchronize and fight irregular warfare.

As Afghanistan and Iraq continue to highlight SOF's capabilities and effectiveness, the GWOT exposed a growing need for SOF integration and leadership. As a result, the Secretary of Defense designated USSOCOM as the "supported combatant

commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks” (CJCS 2006b, 29). The nation recognized that the landscape of warfare was changing. DoD defined this way-ahead recognizing that irregular warfare had “emerged as a major and pervasive form of warfare” (CJCS 2007, x). As with the war on terror, DoD again turned to USSOCOM to take-on this complex, asymmetric task. In 2007, USSOCOM took the lead in outlining the nation’s approach to irregular warfare (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, Introduction). In response to this charter, USSOCOM published DoD’s *IW JOC*. To date, the *IW JOC* is Defense Department’s only joint service guidance provided for irregular warfare.

To further this association with irregular warfare, in 2007, the newly appointed commander of USSOCOM, ADM Eric T. Olson, proposed a comparison and familiarity between Irregular Warfare and SOF Core Missions. The resulting argument lends credibility in considering USSOCOM as the current authority and practitioner in irregular warfare. At a joint conference on *Teaching Irregular Warfare* hosted by the Marine Corps Training and Education Command and the United States Naval Academy, ADM Olson showcased similarities between SOF Core Activities and Irregular Warfare activities.

In table 1, the side-by-side comparison reflects a direct correlation between most SOF core activities and the irregular warfare family. The purpose in exposing this correlation is so that the reader understands that the very nature of SOF contains an inherent experience and knowledge of irregular warfare.

Table 1. Comparison Table of Special Operations vs. Irregular Warfare

<u>SOF Core Activities</u>	<u>Irregular Warfare Family</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counterterrorism (CT) • Unconventional Warfare (UW) • Foreign Internal Defense (FID) • Information and Psychological Operations (IO and PSYOP) • Synchronize the global war on terror (GWOT) • Counterproliferation of WMD • Direct Action (DA) • Special Reconnaissance (SR) • Civil Affairs (CA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrorism/Counterterrorism (CT) • Unconventional Warfare (UW) • Foreign Internal Defense (FID) • Information Operations (IO) • Psychological Operations (PSYOP) • Transnational Primal Activities that Support or Sustain IW and the Law Enforcement Activities to Counter • Insurgency/Counterinsurgency (COIN) • Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations • Civil-Military Operations (CMO) • Intelligence/Counterintelligence Ops

Source: Admiral Eric T. Olson, USSOCOM Commander. 2007. “Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare” (Speech Joint Conference on Training and Education, Quantico, VA), 62.

On today’s battlefield, many of these SOF’s core activities begin to merge into conventional force requirements as the total joint force learns to fight an irregular enemy on a global scale. As SOF core activities increasingly align with conventional force requirements in the emerging environment of irregular warfare, it is important to understand the differences between conventional and unconventional forces. The uniqueness of special operations is defined by the following joint publication:

Special Operations - Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and

political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (CJCS 2007, 501-502)

This definition of special operations reflects both independence and interdependence with conventional forces.

As an example, the above descriptive definition is important as the debate continues whether conventional forces should conduct FID or if this is only a SOF mission. Should SOF or conventional forces train the Iraqi military in Operation Iraqi Freedom? An answer often given is there is simply not enough high demand, low density SOF available, so conventional forces fill the FID role. However, this answer implies that if there were enough SOF, then they should cover the FID mission--an incorrect assumption.

According to the definition, SOF should only conduct FID if there is “no broad conventional force requirement in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.” Iraq no longer meets these criteria. SOF is not the tool to accomplish large-scale force training and operations in a permissive country for a long-standing conventional operation unless political sensitivities still exist. Yes, there are examples when SOF needs to join in shaping such an environment, but SOF is a precise, unconventional force that when carefully inserted into an operation has the greatest affect where conventional forces cannot operate. If SOF becomes consumed in training FID in Iraq, this low density asset might singularly become consumed by one mission thus cutting off its ability to leverage skillsets against other requirements within Central Command (CENTCOM) and various other theaters of operation.

In the future of irregular warfare, SOF will no longer claim a monopoly on SOF core activities. In fact, even today, conventional forces conduct direct action, special reconnaissance, FID, civil-military operations, and information and psychological operations. The requirement for global presence necessitates a sharing of responsibilities as forces work together to cover the variety of theaters and operational environments throughout the world. Most importantly, the team of conventional and unconventional forces requires leaders who deeply understand the players and can best template the playing field for the desired effects.

As the definition implies, SOF does not claim a monopoly on their core tasks but “differs from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets” (CJCS 2007, 501-502). This difference enables SOF to gain access and operate within environments that conventional forces are unable.

Today, SOF works in various witting and unwitting countries to define and shape the emerging environment. In the future, the global nature and complexity of irregular warfare requires this continual presence collaborated with a larger force that can project when the feasible.

The irregular environment demands an asymmetric force that can lead the way for the total joint force. SOF is often the first present within key areas and subsequently conducts preparation of the environment activities. This initial presence allows SOF to develop key relationships and awareness making SOF the best choice for orchestrating and leading the development in sensitive areas. This orchestration may initially include

only SOF or may grow to include conventional force requirements as the area and theater grow in relevancy. Regardless, SOF is the fine *needle* necessary to determine the way ahead for irregular warfare activity. SOF is the precise tool that is used, but as the global battlefield increases, SOF cannot be the only answer. A persistent presence requires a total force solution where unconventional forces provide the shaping and framework, and conventional forces provide the forces to execute long-term strategy within countries and populations willing to accept United States military involvement. SOF will orchestrate but will not execute irregular warfare alone. Conversely, the Services will not execute irregular warfare without SOF.

Because of SOF's specialties operating in non-standard or irregular types of environments, they are able to posture forces globally in sensitive countries interfacing with embassies and other military and agency forces. Their role, by definition, presents a great tool for the DoD to dissect and target the current and future operational environment of irregular warfare. Overall, their role will always be essential yet will continue to be mutually reliant on conventional integration for success.

This mutual reliance is reflected in DoD's *IW JOC*. The *IW JOC* defines a requirement for a "joint force to be as compelling in IW [irregular warfare] as it is in conventional warfare" (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 1). As USSOCOM continues to play a growing role in this "dominant form of warfare" that requires a force integrated, interdependent, and capable of fighting irregular warfare, the blending of SOF and conventional forces becomes increasingly more important (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 36).

Irregular Warfare--Required Blending of Special Operation Forces and Conventional

The result will be a *new breed of warrior* able to move more easily between disparate mission sets while preserving their depth of skill in primary specialties. Future warriors will be *as proficient in irregular operations*, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, *as they are today in high-intensity combat* [emphasis added]. (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 42)

As globalization expands the existing battlespace, the QDR's vision provides foresight as the current joint ground forces transform to meet irregular warfare in the emerging joint operational environment. This "new breed of warrior" reveals a joint force that must "take on more of the tasks performed by today's special operations forces" (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 42). Simply stated, the complexity and primacy of irregular warfare demand a blending of conventional and SOF.

Today, the military is already seeing this blending or blurring of lines as the Army conventional forces conduct FID in Iraq and leverage psychological operations and information operations campaigns. These programs are not simply conventional since the joint force wages campaigns within sensitive environments having strategic effects and often without special operations involvement.

In addition to conventional forces adopting similar special operations missions and skills, the future operational environment becomes increasingly more global and complex requiring a total force approach with truly joint leadership capable of translating critical thinking into immediate decisions. JFCOM defines the complexity of force application in *Joint Operational Environment: Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030* with terms such as "lawfare, cognitive campaigns, and innovative use of emerging technologies" and applying this force through persistent influence over networks and interaction within military and nonmilitary domains (U.S.

Joint Forces Command 2007, 63, 65). Additionally, the military will execute irregular warfare campaigns on a global scale crossing existing geographic combatant command boundaries. The execution of an engagement in today's "battlespace is approaching global dimensions, while the effective range of influence available to individuals can span thousands of miles" (U.S. Joint Forces Command 2007, 57). Increasingly, the operational environment is becoming larger and more complex requiring a level of interaction within military and nonmilitary forces never envisioned before.

Currently, USSOCOM orchestrates this larger and more complex operational environment. As mentioned before, USSOCOM is the lead for synchronization of the GWOT under the *National Military Strategic Policy for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT)* directive. This directive recognizes the need to see beyond geographic boundaries requiring special operations involvement. Today and in the future, USSOCOM will send its forces to the leading edges of emerging battlefronts. Recognizing that many of these areas exist in politically and semi-permissive environments that are only accessible by SOF and other specialized agencies, SOF must be the force within the Defense Department to initiate efforts in breaking ground and preparing the environment for conventional and nonconventional forces to operate.

With hybrid warfare, future adversaries will likely be both state and non-state actors fighting to win legitimacy and support. The fight will be among the people and for the people. These situations will "favor an irregular military approach" to achieve the desired endstate (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 16). Because the desired approach must achieve a balance between conventional and unconventional power, the required solution must involve a joint force approach.

This study defines joint force as a total military Service approach to include special operations that provide both conventional and unconventional solutions sufficiently blended to effectively counter protracted irregular warfare. This definition of joint force is a departure from JP 1-02 that defines joint force as “a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander” (CJCS 2007, 285). Additionally, the Military Departments, as defined by JP 1-02, do not include USSOCOM. The following figure 7 reflects this joint publication paradox. Although SOF is not included in the joint publication definition, this thesis stipulates that the joint force must include special operations.




Figure 7. Author Generated Mental Model of Joint and Joint Force Definitions Lack of Special Operations

Source: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 281, 285, 339. Note: SOF is unique force, which lacks joint integration.

To further support the need for this joint force, the *IW JOC* defines four “how to” requirements that this force must determine:

1. Conduct protracted campaigns to defeat adversary states through indirect methods/means.
2. Conduct protracted campaigns on a global scale to defeat non-state irregular threats.
3. As a supported effort, defeat Irregular Warfare threats independently of conventional operations.
4. As a supporting effort, defeat Irregular Warfare threats in combination with conventional operations (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 17).

These requirements reflect a need for conventional and nonconventional forces and operations working together on a global scale. In order to be effective, leaders must orchestrate and synchronize this total joint force. Only leaders who understand the nature of irregular warfare and the capabilities and cultures of the forces fighting it will effectively harmonize the joint force into a capable irregular warfare campaign.

The current USSOCOM commander, ADM Olson, reflects on the current dichotomy within the joint force in the current operational environment stating that

. . . right now in SOF we have irregular elements working for conventional commanders. They are excluded from much of the campaign planning due to old paradigms. There are pockets where this is not the case, and where progress is made, but that is largely at the tactical level, seldom at the operational level, and rarer still at the strategic level. (Olson 2007, Pedagogy for Long War)

Again, the United States military’s paradigms resist effective integration at every level of war.

In addition, the *IW JOC* offers factors that compound the joint force problem (see table 2). The following factors expose the additional need to blend conventional and unconventional forces.

Table 2. Factors that Compound the Joint Force Problem

Factors That Compound the Joint Force Problem	
IW Factors	Explanation
Expanding Scale	Threat of IW will become increasingly global in scale
Unbounded Scope	Enemy not likely to operate under same legal or moral restrictions as joint force
Protracted Nature	In many cases, adversaries need only to survive or outlast the United States to win
Exploit Op Area (leverage boundaries)	Adversaries operate within and from non-belligerent states to limit/restrict joint force
Political Nature	Military leaders need to think politically as well as militarily; civilian counterparts vice versa
Direct Military Action Paradox	Direct military intervention frequently detracts from the legitimacy of the host nation (HN)

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operations Concept (JOC)* Version 1.0, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 17-18.

The “expanding scale” reflects that the dimension of irregular warfare will span the globe and the normal area of operations will increase. Subsequently, SOF cannot cover this increase in geographic territory within the existing USSOCOM structure.

Additionally, “the expansion of operational areas” proposes that the enemy will not limit themselves to defined geographic boundaries. The current operational environment reflects this expansion through an enemy that operates across state and country boundaries united by extreme religious beliefs, not by geography. The United States military must similarly transform to maneuver like the enemy but legal and force structure restrictions will continue to hamper effective movement. Within this limiting United States legal and force structure, special operations is the force gaining ground to fight asymmetrically and dynamically against an irregular opponent, but must rely on conventional force projection to effectively manage a global campaign.

The expansion of geographic areas is further complicated by the “protracted nature of irregular warfare.” The enemy intends to engage the United States using all instruments of power recognizing that a key center of gravity for the United States is the American people and their tolerance for war. History proves that the United States population has little tolerance for protracted campaigns. Thus, the enemy will attempt to outlast American support and therefore win. To counter the reluctance for protracted warfare, the United States military must educate and train the American public to accept this new level of commitment. The public may more readily accept this level of commitment if engaged by the total military force.

As adversaries “expand to operate from within non-belligerent states,” it is essential that conventional forces get involved. Conventional forces might be the

preferred force over special operations within such states. As special operations focus on politically sensitive, non-permissive environments, conventional force projection and presence in non-belligerent states may provide the presence and stabilization required to dissuade potential adversaries.

Additionally, the “nature of irregular warfare is inherently political” and requires all military leaders to think politically as well as militarily. In a previous sub-text of chapter 4, this thesis explored the working definition of special operations and extracted key terms within this definition to expose that SOF specializes in politically sensitive and non-permissive environment beyond current conventional force capability. Therefore, SOF is often the first to gain access and assess the environment. The complex political nature of irregular warfare requires that SOF gain an additional level of understanding to the political environment as expands within and external to an existing country or region. Additionally, conventional forces must grow to understand and integrate into this increasingly complex political environment as the United States military transitions from SOF to conventional force for projection.

Finally, the paradox of irregular warfare is that the “use of direct military power is often counterproductive.” Although United States military presence within a country may provide stability, the host nation may lose legitimacy. Conversely, the absence of military presence may significantly destabilize a region creating an environment ripe for our adversaries. This complex dynamic of irregular warfare requires additional understanding and blending between special operations and conventional forces. As stated before, SOF can best determine the required tolerance through low-signature covert or clandestine operations. The stated country may be permissive but require politically sensitive leaders

to frame an approach. Additionally, the State Department will already understand some of the sensitivities within the region. In all, the politically sensitive nature associated with irregular warfare requires a deeper understanding of politics by the leaders of both conventional and unconventional forces.

Throughout the factors that compound a joint force problem, the *IW JOC* frames an environment that requires conventional and unconventional force integration. This blending requires orchestration and understanding at all levels amidst two currently divergent cultures. SOF is a specific tool that requires conventional force integration as the global battlefield increases. SOF is not a singularly exclusive answer for irregular warfare. Irregular warfare requires leaders that understand and orchestrate conventional and unconventional forces across the globe. SOF currently orchestrates this global battle mostly internal to SOF. In the future, all leaders must be capable of this blending and orchestration.

Although many factors make the joint force problem challenging, the *IW JOC* proposes a solution. Figure 8 summarizes a solution to irregular warfare. Again, the “means” to accomplish the irregular warfare tasks are “fully integrated US and partner conventional and nonconventional force and capabilities” (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 19). These two forces will become increasingly dependent on one another to prosecute irregular warfare. The total joint force integration is not a Service only solution as defined by today’s joint publications, but joint integration must include a blending of conventional and nonconventional forces and extends to include SOF.

Ends: Friendly political authority and influence over host population are secured and adversary control, influence, and support are denied.

Ways: (This is the **central idea** of this concept.) The joint force will conduct protracted regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct conventional military confrontation. IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support. Unified action by the USG and its strategic partners is essential to winning an irregular war or campaign. While the direct application of military power may not be the primary means of winning IW, joint forces will often be required to support non-military instruments of power and set the conditions for strategic success.

Means: Fully integrated US and partner conventional and nonconventional forces and capabilities.

Figure 8. Irregular Warfare Solution

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operations Concept (JOC)* Version 1.0, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 19.

The *IW JOC* provides a further delineation of joint force requirements. Irregular warfare will require “General Purpose Forces (GPF) to perform missions that in the last few decades have been viewed primarily as SOF activities” (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 23). In order to expand, GPF must increase their breadth and scope of knowledge in cultural awareness, language training, area familiarization, and knowledgeable of the strategic and operational objectives of the area. The solution directly addresses these expansion themes as requirements for the total joint force. Furthermore, the *IW JOC* addresses specific requirements for GPF to support and execute irregular warfare:

1. Conduct and Support Multiple Counterinsurgency Operations on a Global Scale
2. Conduct and Support Counterterrorism on a Global Scale

3. Build Partner Nation Security Force Capacity on a Global Scale
4. Provide Interim Military Government or Perform Civil Administration
5. Provide Support to Distributed Irregular Warfare Operations
6. Creating Alternative Command and Control Mechanisms for Conducting and Supporting (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 23).

These requirements reflect an expansion of roles and missions beyond current conventional force focus. As a reflection of conventional forces expanding role, the Secretary of Defense provided guidance to ensure military operational focus transformed to include SSTR operations (U.S. Department of Defense 2005b, 2). The leadership required to transform and incorporate SSTR operations is essential because the cognitive skills required are markedly different from the skills needed to fight decisive operations. However, this transition to SSTR planning and operations is only the beginning of the transformation required for the United States military. With the advent of irregular warfare, the United States military will fight cognitively and asymmetrically on a global scale through operations that may require full-scale direct action or may require nothing but a gentle recommendation through diplomatic or information channels.

Regardless, the complex nature of the fight requires leaders that can visualize beyond current operational boundaries to fight a boundless and changing enemy. Currently, this orchestrator is USSOCOM as designated by the Secretary of Defense as the “supported combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks” (CJCS 2006b, 29). In areas that are increasingly complex and politically sensitive, special operations will lead DoD efforts that will include conventional and GPF. Consequently, conventional or GPF must

stay engaged, familiar, and ready “to lead and support alongside SOF” anywhere in the globe.

As the Services and joint forces continue to define irregular warfare, recurring themes continue to demand conventional and nonconventional force integration--or otherwise stated as general-purpose forces and SOF. Never before has the blending of these forces played a pivotal role to the overall success of a campaign. Irregular warfare is the future for United States forces and requires an effective integration of special operations and conventional forces.

Yet, even though this integration is essential to the United States success in irregular warfare, special operations and conventional force integration is not a primary concern for the joint force. Today, military leaders believe that the term joint and joint force adequately address Service integration and transformation of special operations within this environment is slow. With limited military growth coupled against a growing and complex problem, special operations and conventional forces must combine efforts to span the globe in order to manage a global irregular warfare campaign. However, to blend differing cultures and thinking methods between SOF and conventional forces, one must first educate these forces in order to instill joint core competencies. The following section explores the current Service and CJCS focus on special operations integration within JPME.

Joint Professional Military Education--The Root of Transformation

The future joint force requires knowledgeable, empowered, innovative, and decisive leaders capable of succeeding in fluid and perhaps chaotic operating environments with more comprehensive knowledge of interagency and multinational cultures and capabilities. (CJCS 2005a, 2)

When investigating solutions to meet required capabilities, the DoD utilizes DOTMLPF. This analytical tool stands for doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (CJCS 2006a, 1). In instituting change, DOTMLPF defines leadership and education as the primary tool for implementing full-spectrum transformation (ACGSC 2007, F102AA-3). The role of PME is to educate and imprint emerging leaders in order to effectively fight and engage an evolving, asymmetric enemy. Furthermore, DoD defines JPME as the “heart of [joint officer development], as schoolhouses are the petri dishes for organizational culture” (CJCS 2005b, 5). The previous subtext proves that conventional and unconventional forces must blend culturally and operationally to fight irregular warfare in the emerging operational environment. This subtext explores the status of JPME and its effectiveness in transforming the blending of conventional and unconventional forces in irregular warfare.

The leading quote to this subtext correlates to the desired framework to build the military’s future leaders for the joint force. As JPME transforms, its guiding document, CJCS Instruction for *OPMEP*, defines this transformation and “regards joint education as fundamental to creating a culture that supports transformation, founded on leaders who are innately joint, and comfortable with change” (CJCS 2005a, A-2). This transformation “requires joint education to prepare leaders both to conduct operations as a coherently joint force and to think their way through uncertainty” (CJCS 2005a, A-2). Joint education is the foundation of our future military leaders. The leadership requirement in the future, irregular operational environment pushes the limits of current conventional and SOF force capability and transformation. At the forefront of obstacles to this

transformation and integration is the current lack of special operations integration into JPME.

Providing Service guidance for joint education, the *OPMEP* provides the policy and standards for all Services JPME. However, as a paramount document, the *OPMEP* fails to define joint force integration to include SOF. In fact, there is a lack of special operations integration throughout all JPME's guiding documents, policies, and laws.

Before exploring the absence of special operations within current Service JPME programs, it is necessary to study the source to the *OPMEP* as controlled and guided by Congress. The initial genesis of Congressional control resulted from the original GNA of 1986. As a result of a two-year study of the Defense Department to include SOF, the GNA contained little guidance for special operations (U.S. Special Operations Command 2007, 5). In fact, special operations are only mentioned once in the GNA but simply to direct the establishment of a special operations combatant command (U.S. Congress 1986, 100STAT1017). The GNA is a foundational document between the Services and special operations, but its intent was to establish and not specifically define SOF.

Subsequent to the GNA, Congress recognized the importance of education in transforming the military cultures and directed Senator Ike Skelton to "review the DoD plans for implementing JPME requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring . . . the proper linkage between the Service officer and the joint officer" (U.S. Congress 1989, v). The resulting *Report of the Panel on Military Education of 1989* provides the most current guidance for JPME to DoD. Better known as the Skelton Report, this document offers in-depth guidance to the Services in producing joint officers through JPME, but does not address special operations integration. Again, similar to the

GNA, the Skelton Report does not contain the term special operation or SOF in over 200 pages of its text. Possibly, this lack of SOF integration is simply the result of a study done concurrently with the establishment of the new USSOCOM. SOF simply did not have enough time or influence to reflect relevancy within JPME.

Today, the *OPMEP* is the living document that defines joint education for the Services. As a policy that gains insight from an over eighteen-year old Congressional report, one may conclude that the *OPMEP* departs from the Skelton Report's lack of current operational relevance. Unfortunately, the *OPMEP* mirrors the Skelton Report's guidance, and SOF integration is lacking. The *OPMEP* provides limited guidance for special operations education to the joint force and only at the senior officer level.

Consequently, the *OPMEP* mandates limited special operations integration for only the Joint Advance Warfighting School at the National Defense University and for Service Senior Level Colleges (CJCS 2005a, E-E-3 to E-H-2). The *OPMEP* does not mandate or guide SOF integration at Service schools leaving the Services to define and integrate. This Service-led integration limits changes outside of Service paradigms. Twenty-two years ago, Service paradigms restricting special operations integration led to the GNA and redefining the Defense Department. Within JPME, no such initiative exists.

A key purpose for the GNA and the Skelton Report is "joint integration." These foundational documents are instrumental in defining the joint force within the DoD. Nevertheless, as the operational environment changes, the DoD must transform to meet challenges unforeseen by the GNA. Irregular warfare as a pervasive and dominant form of warfare requires a blending of conventional and unconventional forces never envisioned and never defined within the DOTMLPF spectrum. Specifically, the required

blending calls for a transformation of cultures and requires a better understanding and integration of SOF.

The United States can change existing policy and definitions but the underlying resistance to the inclusion of SOF may reflect a cultural bias that still exists within the Services. In 1987, Service culture fought hard to prevent the establishment and protection of SOF within an equal-ranked command structure. The Services fought to protect their own manpower, money, and power, but finally fell short as Congress stepped in, transformed DoD, and formed USSOCOM. Today, there may be a similar struggle as an undercurrent to transformation and integration of special operations within Service culture and education. Nevertheless, the required transformation is relevant and necessary for the advancement of all of DoD to create truly joint officers prepared to leverage a total force irregular war.

Additionally, the failure to include SOF within policy or doctrine in joint education creates a ripple effect that extends to *OPMEP* guidance that is absent of SOF and conventional integration. Therefore, this essential integration and education of the future leaders for irregular warfare does not occur.

Today on the current battlefield, this cultural friction is a known problem, but one largely ignored by the Services. Cultural clashing of special operations is not a new development. When asked about the cultural dichotomy between SOF and conventional forces with an increasing requirement for integration, the Acting J7 Director, Brigadier General Rounds states:

It is interesting. For the time that I have been in the service, the two worlds [SOF and Conventional] have lived intently apart from each other. Now all of a sudden we are in a conflict in shared battlespace . . . where we have figured out how to

get along in that shared battlespace. But, it's a marriage of necessity instead of a marriage of 100% buy-in or embracement. (Rounds 2008)

This “marriage of necessity” reflects the ongoing friction between conventional and unconventional forces on the battlefield. In the emerging operational environment that increasingly relies on a “shared battlespace” led by SOF or conventional forces, it is critical to reduce this friction. Unfortunately, this integration is not a focus for current educational change. Interestingly, it is the most important change for joint integration that our DoD military force can make. Luckily, this change is internal and unlike interagency integration, does not rely on outside department cooperation or Congressional mandate.

Figure 9 depicts the JPME versus operational environment dichotomy. The left figure suggests that the current JPME model does not integrate or properly define SOF. The right figure reflects the current operational model that recognizes SOF as central to executing and leading irregular warfare integration throughout the Services. Overall, Service-led JPME does not teach or reflect the required integration of special operations in the current and future operational environments.




Figure 9. Current JPME Model vs. Current/Future Operational Environment Model

As an example to the above dichotomy, the Skelton Report and *OPMEP* defines Service ILC and Senior Level Colleges (SLC) class and seminar student compositions requiring a certain percentage of Service students present in each class. This required composition does not include SOF. Essentially, the Skelton Report and *OPMEP* do not mandate SOF student participation or attendance within JPME (CJCS 2005a, B-1 to B-2). Additionally, JPME faculty mix and composition originates from the three military departments (Army, Air Force, Navy/Marines) and does not include USSOCOM. Absent of guidance or direction, the Services and USSOCOM will not change the educational environment.

Within the existing Service ILC programs, the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is the only Service ILC with a dedicated SOF Education Element. As the premier example of a special operations education model within Service ILC, this SOF Education Element still lacks power for effective integration. First, the education element exists at the mercy of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, which provides manpower and oversight to the cell. The element maintains courtesy coordination with USSOCOM. USSOCOM has no direct role as defined within Congressional or DoD policy. Secondly, this ad hoc cell falls under the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations (DJIMO). As a subset to Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, the SOF Education Element relies on relationships and competing priorities within non-SOF elements and other departments. This relationship functions not out of necessity but out of convenience within a Service-led curriculum and relies on personalities not policy to effect change. Finally, the Army ILC program within the Command and General Staff College provides

only four-hours of SOF education and discussion. Although the schoolhouse dedicates this time to special operations instruction, the quality of instruction is constrained by instructor and student experience.

USSOCOM is not a service and therefore does not earn proper integration within the Service JPME programs. The growing prominence of irregular warfare requires a different approach to education and requires a stronger role of special operations integration. However, even if SOF received proper guidance and power to integrate within Service JPME programs, is USSOCOM prepared to integrate and educate the joint force?

Joint Professional Military Education--Current Way Ahead

Before reflecting on current gaps in JPME that hinder special operations and Service integration, it is important to examine the CJCS's vision regarding the future of joint education. As previously noted, the CJCS views joint integration by Service not by combatant commands (specifically USSOCOM). Additionally, the CJCS provided specific vision regarding JPME to include shaping leaders that contain a "more comprehensive knowledge of interagency and multinational cultures and capabilities" (CJCS 2005a, 2). There is no mention of special operations integration in the future JPME way ahead.

Reflecting this strategy, the CJCS Director of Education and Acting J7, BG Michael Rounds noted that interagency integration and cultural/regional awareness education were the leading elements for future transformation within JPME (Rounds 2008). SOF education and inclusion is noticeably absent from any proposed changes or future concerns into the already existing "joint" education environment. Reflecting an

additional lack of SOF focus, the visiting CJCS PAJE team did not target special operations integration and effectiveness through its discussion and analysis with students. As a reflection of the *OPMEP*, the PAJE team and J7 staff lack SOF expertise or any SOF accreditation standards to measure effectiveness. This current lack of SOF focus within JPME reveals possible challenges in effectively transforming the educational environment for irregular warfare and the required SOF and conventional force integration.

Joint Professional Military Education--Can The Current System Work?

As the previous subtexts delineate, the current JPME system does not effectively include SOF education for future conventional and unconventional leaders to enable the necessary synergy in irregular warfare. As one turns to potential recommendations, the first question is often “can the current system produce the change required?” In analyzing this question, we will address changes from a bottom-up approach. There are many, many layers within JPME, but this section will address the two main orchestrators and implementers of current JPME: the Service-led JPME institutions and the CJCS J7 Directorate.

At the root level, Service-led schools are the primary implementers of JPME for the majority of officers within the United States military and contain several barriers to JPME change. The first barrier is that JPME curriculum competes with equally important Service requirements. Additionally, current *OPMEP* JPME learning objectives and standards are broadly defined allowing Service ILC institutions to accommodate general, subjective standards.

With less than a year to educate its future leaders, Service ILC institutions must carefully balance time and exposure for the future student leader. As a Service-led institution, Service priorities will always outweigh the currently broadly defined JPME requirements. For instance, the Army Command and General Staff College struggles to transform its curriculum to meet the current operational environment as well as train future Army officers for staff positions. As a student within this system, the author has observed firsthand the course limitations and accepted risk of including training over education. However, the Army adequately justifies this risk recognizing that its ILC program is the only avenue available to train its Majors. Service priorities will continue to compete and prevail against Service-led JPME.

Subsequently, Service ILC programs, like Army Command and General Staff College, will state that SOF integration is sufficient and that their program includes sufficient SOF inclusion within its education and training. At the surface, this concept is true but a deeper analysis reveals a lack of SOF integration. For example, Army Command and General Staff College conducts several exercises and discussions throughout the year that include potential SOF integration and discussion. Unfortunately, to be effective, this integration relies on sufficient SOF experience by both students and instructors. However, without a dedicated SOF student or instructor ratio within the classrooms, effective SOF instruction or education does not occur. Additionally, the curriculum compresses the exercises, which results in a domination of conventional force application. In other words, the products and processes are conventionally oriented and do not include effective SOF integration. The current JPME standards and existing Service ILC timeline simply do not allow it.

Finally, Service ILC institutions may offer electives as a means to expose students to SOF and irregular warfare. Unfortunately, electives do not ensure total force exposure and since they are optional, only certain students choose exposure.

In addition to the barriers that exist within Service-led JPME ILC curriculums and institutions, the CJCS contains personnel and staffing processes that hinder transformation of JPME. The CJCS oversees implementation and policy for officer education through the CJCS J7 Directorate with a stated mission as follows:

The Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, J-7, provides assistance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by enhancing joint force development through war plans, doctrine, education, training, exercises, and the assessment of each through the observation of Commanders in Chief and CJCS exercises and real world operations. (CJCS J-7 Mission)

The J-7 implements the above mission through four subordinate divisions and as such “acts as functional agent to support and facilitate the Chairman’s transformation efforts” (CJCS J-7 Mission). Within these four directorates, the *Joint Education Directorate* “formulates Joint Professional Military Education policy and programs; conducts the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education; [and coordinates for the] periodic review of all JPME curricula” (CJCS J-7 Mission). Figure 10 depicts the current CJCS organization chart for implementing JPME:




Figure 10. CJCS Organizational Chart Reflecting JPME

Source: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7 Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, “Mission,” <http://www.jcs.mil/j7/index.html> (accessed 5 May 2008).

According to the *OPMEP*, “an ongoing review of PME satisfies CJCS statutory requirements and guarantees the effectiveness of professional military education” (CJCS 2005a, C-1). This process is composed of three requirements:

1. Feedback mechanisms
2. Update mechanisms
3. JPME assessments (CJCS 2005a, C-1).

The primary feedback and update mechanism for PME is through the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC).

The MECC serves as an advisory body to the Director, Joint Staff, on joint education issues, and consists of the MECC Principals and a supporting MECC Working Group. The purpose of the MECC is to address key educational issues of interest to the joint education community, promote cooperation and collaboration among the MECC member institutions and coordinate joint education initiatives. (CJCS 2005a, C-1)

Current principals and voting members within the MECC are: “the Deputy Director, Joint Staff for Military Education (DDJS-ME); the presidents, commandants and directors of the joint and Service universities and colleges; and the heads of any other JPME-certified or accredited institutions; and the USJFCOM/J-7” (CJCS 2005a, C-1). USSOCOM is completely absent as a principal within the MECC and, as such, SOF does not have a voice nor representation within the committee.

In order to update the *OPMEP* and implement changes within JPME, the MECC must approve of changes. The most notable way to implement updates within JPME is through Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs). SAEs “highlight the concerns of OSD, the Services, Defense agencies, and the Joint Staff regarding coverage of specific joint subject matter in the PME colleges” (CJCS 2005a, C-3). SAEs appear promising as “they help ensure the currency and relevance of the colleges’ JPME curricula and provide an independent view of what those curricula should address” (CJCS 2005a, C-3). Anyone may recommend SAEs, but the MECC decides what SAEs are forwarded and recommended to the Director, Joint Staff. Nevertheless, even after SAEs receive approval, the CJCS merely distributes them as recommendations for the joint and Service colleges to incorporate into their existing curriculum--“inclusion is not required” (CJCS 2005a, C-4).

If the reader is confused in how to implement changes and recommendations within JPME, the author agrees. Overall, the educational system hinders rapid change. Even with recognized changes, the CJCS competes with current ILC timelines and Service title 10 educational authorities. The Acting Director, J7, Brigadier General Rounds acknowledges that changes to JPME curriculum changes and development do not happen overnight (Rounds 2008). Additionally, General Rounds realizes that transformational change within the existing system can take two years but recognizes that “some other things will need to fall off the plate” (Rounds 2008).

The current CJCS system hinders the required transformation of JPME in a world that is moving at a much faster pace than policy and curriculum can change. The effectiveness of the education process within the CJCS is a sufficient study by itself. However, this thesis simply aims to identify the complexity of the existing system and the lack of SOF inclusion within this existing system.

Conclusion

As special operations grow in relevancy and leadership within irregular warfare and the GWOT, JPME must transform to meet the emerging operational environment and required education for the future leaders. Currently, JPME struggles as a Service-led joint program with guidance originating from the late-1980s. Additionally, the current process for JPME review and change is slow and does not provide sufficient integration of SOF as a relevant and key leader within DoD. The current JPME guidance as reflected in the Skelton Report and *OPMEP* do not reflect the current and future operational picture.

Additionally, CJCS believes it has obtained the required amount of joint integration as defined by the Skelton Report and has moved on to other focus areas. As

JPME evolves to focus on a “more comprehensive knowledge of interagency and multinational cultures and capabilities,” a closer look is first required of its current effectiveness in “joint” education--an education that currently reinforces Service-only integration (CJCS 2005a, 2).

Is Special Operations adequately integrated into Joint Professional Military Education? The answer to the primary question for this thesis is no. As irregular warfare shapes the emerging operational environment, truly joint education must include SOF at an equal level to the Services in order to begin the integration and education required to blend cultures and create truly capable joint force leaders for irregular warfare. Given SOF’s relevancy and role of primacy within the GWOT and Irregular Warfare, this paper shows current gaps and argues for an increase in SOF and conventional integration through JPME. Congress, DoD, Services, and USSOCOM must recognize the changes in the existing and future operational environment--specifically special operations role--and transform JPME. Since inception, USSOCOM has operated with Service level uniqueness and importance, but without inclusion in JPME. As the key to transforming the culture and leadership of the military to fight irregular warfare, the next chapter explores the recommendations that may lead to effective JPME transformation.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

Achieving the CJCS vision for JOD requires identification of *internal issues* (those with solutions solely within the purview and prerogative of the Department of Defense) and *external issues* (those with solutions affected by other USG agencies including the legislative branch of the government, the private sector, international and multinational coordination, etc). Changes to title 10 USC will be required, specifically to the definition of joint matters and in sections dealing with joint officer management and JPME. (CJCS 2005b, 10)

Chapter 4 built a case that USSOCOM is leading many of the nation's and military's efforts in irregular warfare and the GWOT, yet their role in educating our leaders about SOF and the future of irregular warfare cannot be found in current JPME guidance. As a specific answer to the primary research question, SOF is *not* adequately integrated into JPME and therefore this thesis explores potential fixes. The introductory quote from the JOD provides an overview of the areas of recommendations required for transformation. Although the JOD recognizes that DoD requires internal and external changes, it does not specify the details of these changes. This thesis explores one potential angle required for this transformation--SOF integration within JPME. Essentially, USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a unique, specialized mission that is leading (synching) a global effort throughout the combatant commands but does not have a voice to educate our leaders on SOF and the required full spectrum integration. This chapter will explore both internal and external recommendations for accomplishing the required unconventional and conventional blending for irregular warfare within JPME.

Congressional Recommendations

Changes to title 10 USC will be required, specifically to the definition to joint matters and in sections dealing with joint officer management and JPME. (CJCS 2005b, 10)

Within the context of true change, one approach is to attack the problem from the top in an effort to direct change downward versus relying on a slow spread emanating from the bottom. As DoD attempts transformation to meet the emerging operational environment, there are *external issues* that only the legislative branch of government can provide assistance (CJCS 2005b, 10). The following subtext aims to provide potential recommendations to Congress as the owner of Title 10 authorities and the originator of the current guiding documents to JPME--the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Skelton Report of 1989.

First, although the JOD does not explicitly define the issues with the current definition of joint, it does note that “changes to title 10 . . . specifically to the definition to joint matters” are required. Chapter 4 notes that special operations is not included in the current definition of joint. However, within the context of the joint force, current and future operations presume this inclusion of SOF. SOF relevancy and primacy in the world on terror and irregular warfare for the emerging operational environment necessitates a redefining of “joint.” Current definitions assume Service-only integration for an effective joint force. This definition lags behind current and future operational demands that require special operations integration as a unique force that will lead efforts in politically sensitive and potentially in-accessible areas. Although the definition of joint is defined within DoD publications, legislative guidance reflects these DoD publications. By

reviewing whether SOF deserves inclusion as a separate element within the existing joint force structure, Congress may find that additional SOF integration is required.

Second, as the leading element for joint officer development, JPME requires potential updates parallel to the ongoing transformation efforts of the current administration and the legislative branch. With nearly twenty-year old guidance, Congress should appoint another panel to review and assess PME as it relates to the current and future operational environment. The current focus of JPME transformation is on interagency integration, and although this element is critical to the future of the military, it presumes that joint force integration internal to DoD is sufficient. With a new review of PME, Congress should take into account the growing relevancy and role of SOF and recommend potential changes to the existing PME structure to facilitate conventional and unconventional blending and the required culture changes that must take place to ensure an effective joint force. Finally, if this blending is considered worthwhile, Congress should examine the current instructor and student ratios and establish sufficient ratios to accommodate a better blending of conventional and unconventional. Since many JPME issues cross Service lines, potential Congressional action, like the Skelton Report of 1989, provides the catalyst for Service-led JPME to change.

Third, if Congress finds purpose in SOF integration within the definition of joint matters and within JPME, title 10 USC requires an update for JPME guidance to the Services and USSOCOM. Currently, USSOCOM's title 10 authorities for education are limited to "monitoring the . . . professional military education of special operations forces officer" (U.S. Congress 2006). This authority mandates an internal focus for USSOCOM

and does not extend externally to the larger Service forces. Specifically, Congress will need to review Title 10-Armed Forces, Subtitle A-General Military Law, Part I-Organization and General Military Powers, Chapter 6-Combatant Commands, Section 167-Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations. In addition to reviewing and updating Title 10 for USSOCOM, a review of other Service Title 10 authorities is required to ensure proper integration of SOF.

Finally, if Congress determines that SOF integration is required across JPME, legislation must increase the manning and budget within DoD to include CJCS staff and oversight, the Service JPME institutions, and USSOCOM. This increase will ensure effective student integration, instructor hiring/training/education/development and the procurement of office space and equipment. Furthermore, Congress should consider potential JPME consolidation to allow education to sustain more effective student ratios as new processes continue growing.

Table 3 reflects an overview of recommendations that require Congressional action.

Table 3. Recommendations for Congress

Recommendations for Congress

- 1) Review current legacy definition of joint and joint force within the military; consider redefining this joint force definition to include special operations; consider better defining SOF role and leadership within the DoD for the purpose of joint force integration
- 2) Appoint a Congressional Panel to review and assess PME and JPME as within the current and future operational environments; review special operations relevancy and role in the current/future operational environment and recommend potential changes to the existing PME structure to facilitate integration of conventional and unconventional forces; examine the current instructor and student ratios relating to conventional and unconventional integration
- 3) Review Title 10 education authorities for SOCOM and Services; consider expanding SOCOM role in Service-led JPME
- 4) Congressional manning and budget increase within Services and SOCOM to accommodate a surge and continuance of SOF integration across the existing JPME programs

There is not a quick fix to the above recommendations. Moving too quickly or granting immediate authorities for implementation could complicate and frustrate the established JPME system. Additionally, although JPME is listed as the “heart of [joint officer development],” JPME is not considered as important to current operations and training (CJCS 2005b, 5). The United States is engaged in a complex war on multiple fronts and must carefully consider changes to a fully engaged system. Perhaps Congress, as an interested but separate party, is the best organization to take an objective look at JPME. The military as an organization is slow to change, and Service parochialisms inhibit required growth. As irregular warfare continues to challenge our military, a careful and considerate review by Congress is required above Service organizations to

provide the objective direction needed. The above recommendations reflect the initial approach suggested to transform JPME.

Department of Defense Recommendations

Apart from Congressional involvement, the DoD, as the leading organization for the United States military, is capable of instituting internal JPME change. The following recommendations and analysis target the civilian led leadership of DoD and specifically does not address changes within CJCS (reserved as a separate subtext). Keeping it above the CJCS, the combatant commands, and the Service chief level allows the Defense Department to take an objective look outside of existing command and Service parochialisms or interests. The following recommendations look similar to the Congressional recommendations relying on an objective view by leadership untainted by insular Service or command effects.

First, DoD needs to identify and define the proper level of conventional and unconventional force integration needed for the future operational environment. In order to define proper SOF integration, DoD requires an impartial study, possibly conducted by RAND Corporation, to identify shortfalls in JPME and the future operational environment.

Secondly, DoD needs to review and update the definition of joint and joint forces to include SOF. The uniqueness of SOF and the transition into a role of primacy in irregular warfare requires a redefining of existing joint matters. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recognized this uniqueness and increased USSOCOM's roles and responsibilities to include synchronization across Services for leading the GWOT (CJCS 2006b, 29). JPME requires a similar review concerning irregular warfare and SOF's role.

As chapter 4 shows, many DoD documents, most notably the QDR, reflect the prominence of irregular warfare and the required blending of conventional and unconventional into an effective joint force. DoD transformation first requires a redefining of the legacy definition of “joint” and “joint force” to facilitate this change.

Thirdly, if the leadership of DoD agrees that SOF requires integration into JPME equal to Service integration, then DoD will need to mandate changes within the CJCS J7 directorate responsible for JPME. Specifically, CJCS J7 requires the addition of SOF billets into key positions within the directorate. At a minimum, USSOCOM requires voting representation on the MECC. In addition, the MECC and OPMEP must accept an increased level of SOF integration. Essentially, USSOCOM must work with the existing educational system to blend unconventional education for all forces within JPME. This initial role may require an additional level of authority and responsibility as USSOCOM injects necessary changes beyond what the MECC may permit. There will inevitably be friction as USSOCOM enters into this process, but cultural friction and misunderstandings will continue to exist until an effective cultural blending occurs. Because of SOF’s growing leadership role within GWOT and irregular warfare, USSOCOM requires a powerful vote within the existing JPME process.

In addition to involvement and increased voting power to shape the OPMEP, the increase of SOF integration within JPME requires SOF officer representation within key elements of the CJCS J7 Staff, namely the Joint Education and Doctrine Division. However, opening key positions within the J7 Staff is not enough. DoD must implement policy directives that enable and direct sufficient SOF integration. Additionally,

publishing a timeline with required milestones for implementation will encourage action towards a defined endstate.

Table 4 reflects an overview of recommendations for DoD.

Table 4. Recommendations for Department of Defense

Recommendations for DoD	
1)	Conduct an impartial study to identify and define the proper level of conventional and unconventional force integration required for the future
2)	Review and update current Joint Publications and doctrine on the terms <i>joint</i> and <i>joint force</i> to reflect the current operational environment and the inclusion of SOF
3)	Review and revamp existing CJCS education directorate to accommodate integration of SOF
4)	Implement policy directives that enable SOF JPME integration

Overall, DoD has the ability to implement the identified SOF and conventional force integration change within JPME. This implementation requires identifying the problem, redefining key definitions within doctrine, and implementing changes throughout the JPME system.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommendations

Each introductory quote to the above subtexts comes from the CJCS JOD. Therefore, the JOD recognizes a need for transformation within the CJCS. The author

chose to delineate DoD recommendations from CJCS recommendations in order to reflect changes that the CJCS can implement without direction from the Secretary of Defense. The following subtext provides potential recommendations for CJCS to integrate SOF and conventional forces within JPME.

First, CJCS must redefine the *OPMEP* to include sufficient SOF integration across the JPME spectrum. This includes, but is not limited to, ensuring USSOCOM is a principal member of the MECC. Although chapter 4 exploits existing limitations of the *OPMEP* and CJCS J7 directorate, redefining the *OPMEP* for including SOF with adequate representation of USSOCOM within the MECC is a sufficient start.

Secondly, CJCS must direct USSOCOM to establish a robust educational organization or directorate capable of implementing SOF education both internal and external to USSOCOM. This direction will coincide with DoD or Congress providing the sufficient manpower and funding to facilitate the creation of this new organizational. Without a significant educational investment by USSOCOM, the integration of SOF and conventional forces will lack the continued guidance and updates necessary in the evolving, complex nature of irregular warfare.

Next, CJCS must provide equal representation within the joint and Service schools by establishing a SOF Directorate that works to establish and integrate SOF instruction and curriculum within the schoolhouse, but works for and receives guidance from USSOCOM. Although this structure does not currently exist, the direct reporting line to USSOCOM ensures consistent execution of SOF integration within all joint or Service schools. In turn, USSOCOM will fill these billets with SOF officers and contractors with the experience and knowledge to execute full spectrum SOF integration.

Finally, these changes and recommendations will not be easy for the Services or for USSOCOM. Therefore, CJCS must temper an effective integration plan into the existing joint and Service schools. Creating joint billets, spaces, organizations, and other mechanisms will take time. In the interim, CJCS might consider consolidating SOF instruction and program development within an existing joint or Service school. This consolidation will allow testing for sufficient SOF student and instructor ratios, as well as provide the initial groundwork to expand the SOF program and expertise throughout the existing JPME system. The table 5 summarizes the recommendations for CJCS.

In all, CJCS can provide sufficient changes internal to its organization for the integration of SOF and conventional forces within JPME. But to ensure these recommendations stand the test of time and personalities of changing administrations, effective policy change above CJCS is recommended.

Table 5. Recommendations for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Recommendations for CJCS	
1)	Redefine OPMEP to include SOF integration within JPME; include SOCOM as a principal on MECC
2)	Direct SOCOM to establish a robust educational organization or directorate capable of implementing SOF education both internal and external to SOCOM
3)	Establish SOF directorates, filled and reportable to SOCOM, within joint and Service JPME schools
4)	Consider temporarily consolidating SOF instructor experience within an existing joint or Service school to build a base for future SOF instructors

Additional Recommendations

The study discovered several additional insights that might prove worthy of additional research. The following recommendations come from working on the outskirts of the CJCS and USSOCOM professional military education systems.

Foremost, this thesis avoided recommending specific changes to the JPME process as defined in the OPMEP. The author surmises that the existing JPME accreditation and implementation process needs work. The current process of recommending changes through formal boards consisting of existing Service school primaries may create an environment that hinders necessary change while promoting Service biases. Additionally, a yearly meeting constrained by time and interests may not be enough time to adequately address special areas of emphasis that compete with existing Service curriculum. Finally, there is a large gap in monitoring the execution of JPME learning objectives into classroom instruction. CJCS allows Service interpretation to play strongly in adherence to existing guidance. In other words, the OPMEP learning objectives are general enough to allow generous Service interpretation and implementation.

Additionally, although not specifically addressed, this thesis discovered a significant lack of USSOCOM guidance for SOF students. Although this discovery might be a result of USSOCOM's inability to directly affect its personnel within existing Service-led educational systems, the fact remains that SOF leaders require specific SOF education to continue leading unconventional operations. The global landscape is becoming increasingly complex and SOF leaders internal to USSOCOM require education different from conventional forces to remain active and relevant. However, if

some of the recommendations within this thesis bear fruit, then SOF may have sufficient representation within the Service schools to facilitate a cadre of SOF instruction within SOF unique subject areas.

Final Conclusion

Irregular warfare is a complex, asymmetric war occurring on a global battlefield that requires a synergy between Services, geographic combatant commanders, USSOCOM, host nation, interagency, and non-governmental agencies. The men and women who will continue to fight and lead this war must understand its nature and the force required to fight it. Internal to DoD, the total joint force must merge into a seamless current of conventional and unconventional forces blending together to prosecute this complex, global campaign by properly leveraging the unique advantages of SOF combined with conventional application. Globalization combined with the increasing rate of information sharing demands a total joint force than can quickly morph to meet a continually dynamic enemy.

Envisioning the current and future operational environment of irregular warfare, the global landscape necessitates forces that can project throughout many nations that may support or deny United States military presence. Regardless of a nation or state boundaries that may or may not support the United States, the enemy may harbor a presence and breeding ground that requires United States involvement. Therefore, the United States requires a global approach to synergize the emerging irregular warfare environment. Currently, USSOCOM is postured to take lead with the current resident irregular warfare expertise as well as an existing global presence as they template and fight the GWOT. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense has granted USSOCOM lead for

GWOT and current lead for establishing a joint operational concept for irregular warfare. USSOCOM plays a leadership role in the current and future operational environment.

However, as irregular warfare transforms the strategic, operational, and tactical battlefield, leaders continue learn and develop through Service-led educational systems that struggle to provide joint and Service education in a compressed period. JPME defines joint integration through the GNA and Skelton Report--documents that are over two decades old. Joint integration does not include the appropriate inclusion of SOF as a relevant and unique element on the irregular battlefield.

This thesis illustrates that the emerging operational environment requires a blending of conventional and unconventional forces not properly reflected in current JPME. As JPME moves on to focus on additional and growing tasks, this thesis recommends a critical evaluation of current joint integration that precludes SOF. As conventional and unconventional mission sets converge, the global landscape necessitates leaders who can effectively integrate and leverage both SOF and GPF appropriately.

Beyond suggestion, execution of change within JPME may prove challenging. Like the GNA, JPME requires potential Congressional action to necessitate change within Service-led organization for the inclusion of SOF. Within the DoD, change is possible and requires not only a willingness to change but also an honest assessment of future operational requirements and the required mix of the total joint force. The irregular enemy gains ground through continual transformation to match opposing forces. The United States must be capable of transforming with matched or increased agility. The author hopes that current processes and systems can meet this challenge.

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